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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final 
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
(Honorable William A. Thorne). Cheryl Holmstrom, the 
plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (j). The 
Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, '"poured" this appeal "over" to this Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) . 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether, in this case in which Ms. Holmstrom's theory 
of the case, and the evidence regarding defendant-appellee 
Joseph Hyatt's negligence, included Mr. Hyatt's selection of an 
unsafe route along which to drive the C.R. England truck, and 
in which the "substantial role" aspect of proximate cause law 
was central to the jury's no-proximate-cause determination, the 
District Court committed reversible error in refusing to give 
Ms. Holmstrom's proposed "unsafe route" instruction. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard of appellate review with 
respect to this issue appears to be de novo (as purely a 
question of law). "[A]ppellate review of a trial court!s 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
1 
Ncorrectness. !fl State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
"correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of the law." Id.; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 
433 (Utah 1993). See, also, in the specific context of jury 
instructions, Ong Intfl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). Also, to require a new trial, any 
error in jury instructions must be prejudicial. E.g., Vitale 
v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah App. 1996); 
Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court 
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's submission of her proposed Jury 
Instruction No. S-2 (R. at 778), and by argument, culminating 
in the District Court's refusal to include that instruction in 
its charge to the jury (Tr. Vol. V, 808-14). 
B. Whether, in this case in which Ms. Holmstrom was 
driving at. what Mr. Hyatt and his employer, defendant-appellee 
C.R. England, Inc., acknowledged to be a reasonable speed when 
Mr. Hyatt made a wide right turn and partially blocked the lane 
of travel in which Ms. Holmstrom was traveling, in which 
Ms. Holmstrom braked hard and tried to go left, and in which 
the jury determined that Mr. Hyatt's negligence was not a 
proximate cause of any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries, the 
District Court committed reversible error in refusing to give 
2 
the "sudden peril" proximate cause instruction proposed by 
Ms. Holmstrom. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard of appellate review with 
respect to this issue appears to be de novo (as purely a 
question of law). ff[A]ppellate review of a trial courtf s 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
* correctness. ,,f State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); 
"correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of the law." Id.; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 
433 (Utah 1993). See, also, in the specific context of jury 
instructions, Ong Int!l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). Also, to require a new trial, any 
error in jury instructions must be prejudicial. E.g., Vitale 
v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah App. 1996); 
Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court 
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's submission of her proposed Jury 
Instruction S-3 (R. at 779), and by oral argument, culminating 
in the trial court's refusal to utilize the instruction 
submitted by Ms. Holmstrom.1 
1
 It should be noted that the District Court, after ruling that it would not 
give the subject proposed instruction, stated that it would consider giving 
-} 
C. Whether the District Court committed reversible error 
in denying the first part of Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for Partial 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial on 
Remaining Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial on All 
Issues, based on the proposition that no reasonable jury could 
determine that Mr. Hyatt's negligence was not a proximate cause 
of at least some of Ms. Holmstrom's claimed injuries and 
damages. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
A trial court is justified in granting a directed 
verdict only if, considering all the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent 
evidence that would support a verdict for the non-moving party. 
Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999). A 
trial court should grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict only when it determines, after reviewing the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict for the non-moving party. 
E.g., Ricci v. Schoultz, 963 P.2d 784, 785 (Utah App. 1998). 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to 
a somewhat similar instruction (Tr. Vol. V, 819-22); that the parties were 
unable to agree on a substitute; and that no ''sudden peril" instruction was 
ultimately included in the District Court's charge to the jury. 
4 
t h i s issue i s tha t the appel la te court wil l "reverse only if, 
viewing the evidence in the l igh t most favorable to the 
prevai l ing par ty , [ i t ] conclude[s] tha t the evidence i s 
insuf f ic ien t to support the v e r d i c t . " 2 Collins v. Wilson, 984 
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1999). In unusual circumstances, a 
reviewing court may reassess witness c r e d i b i l i t y i f the 
testimony i s " inherent ly improbable." State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved in the Dis t r i c t Court 
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's motion for di rected verdic t (Tr. 
Vol. V, 832-32) at the conclusion of defendants' case and by 
submission of P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Pa r t i a l Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial on Remaining 
Issues or, in the Al ternat ive , for New Tria l on All Issues (R. 
at 899-901), her Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. at 
907-922), her submission of her Reply Memorandum in support of 
tha t Motion (R. at 938-946), and at ora l argument (Tr. of 
February 25, 1999 proceedings, at 1-25) on tha t Motion. 
D. Whether the Di s t r i c t Court committed revers ib le er ror 
in denying the second part of Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for 
2
 This r e c i t a t i o n of the app l i cab l e s tandard of a p p e l l a t e review i s taken, 
verbatim, from "Utah Standards of Appel la te Review - Revised ," by Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, an a r t i c l e t h a t appeared in a recent e d i t i o n of the Utah 
Bar Jou rna l . Ms. Holmstrom's counsel a l s o c r e d i t t h a t a r t i c l e for o the r 
p a r t s of the a n a l y s i s s tandard of a p p e l l a t e review a n a l y s i s s e t fo r th in 
t h i s Brief . 
c 
Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial 
on Remaining Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial on 
All Issues. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
So long as the district court applies the correct 
legal standards, a trial court has discretion to deny a motion 
for new trial (e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 
937, 940 (Utah 1993). The applicable standard of appellate 
review with respect to this issue appears to be whether the 
District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying that 
second part of that Motion. Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008, 
1010 (Utah 1973). In unusual circumstances, a reviewing court 
may reassess witness credibility if the testimony is 
"inherently improbable." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1993). The verdict will be reversed if no substantial 
evidence, or insufficient evidence, supports it. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989). Evidence is 
insufficient if it "so clearly preponderates in favor of the 
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the 
outcome of the case/' Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 
P.2d 1213, 1216 (Utah App. 1997).3 A new trial should be 
3
 It may be of interest to the Court that it is the judgment on the jury's 
verdict in Ortiz that appears to have been appealed, rather than a denial of 
6 
ordered only in those rare cases when a jury verdict is 
manifestly against the weight of the evidence. E.g., Goddard 
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court 
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's submission of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New 
Trial on Remaining Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial 
on All Issues (R. at 899-901), her Memorandum in support of 
that Motion (R. at 907-922), her submission of her Reply 
Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. at 938-946), and at 
oral argument (Tr. of February 25, 1999 proceedings, at 1-25) 
on that Motion. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: FACTS AND SIGNIFICANT 
PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT LITIGATION 
On September 29, 1993, Cheryl Holmstrom, the plaintiff-
appellant, was driving, in a Nissan Stanza, westbound on 
Division Lane approaching Park Street, in Salt Lake City {E.g., 
Tr. Vol. Ill, 504-08). Defendant-appellee Joseph Hyatt, while 
in the course and scope of his employment with defendant C.R. 
England, Inc., driving a semi-tractor (without a trailer 
attached), was attempting to make a right turn from northbound 
Park Street onto Division Lane {E.g., Tr. Vol. II, 122-24). 
the plaintiff's motion for new trial (if such a motion was even filed), and 
that the ultimate standard of appellate review seems to be, in either event, 
"sufficiency of the evidence." 
n 
The two vehicles collided. Ms. Holmstrom suffered serious 
orthopedic injuries, including foot and ankle fractures, and 
incurred, for treatment of those injuries alone, health care 
expenses in a stipulated amount in excess of $44,000.00. R. at 
761. Ms. Holmstrom allegedly sustained, in addition to her 
physical injuries, post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Ms. Holmstrom brought this action seeking to recover for 
her injuries and damages suffered, sustained, and incurred in 
the subject collision, alleging that Mr. Hyatt (an acknowledged 
agent of C.R. England, Inc.), was negligent and that 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence was a proximate cause of damages 
sustained by Ms. Holmstrom. R. at 1-4. C.R. England, Inc. and 
Mr. Hyatt denied that Mr. Hyatt was negligent, denied that his 
negligence was a proximate cause of any of Ms. Holmstrom's 
damages, and contended that Ms. Holmstrom was negligent and 
that her negligence was the proximate cause of her damages. R. 
at 6-9. At the conclusion of the case presented by C.R. 
England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt, Ms. Holmstrom moved for directed 
verdict on her contentions regarding Mr. Hyatt's negligence and 
the proximate cause connection between that negligence and her 
sustaining of injuries and damages. Tr. Vol. V, 831-32. The 
District Court denied that Motion. Id., 833. 
The District Court (accepting the argument of counsel for 
C.R. England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt) refused to give a jury 
8 
instruction, prepared by Ms. Holmstrom, to the effect that 
negligent conduct could be based on the negligent selection of 
a route (in addition to driving conduct itself). Tr. Vol. V, 
808-14. 
The District Court also (at the urging of counsel for C.R. 
England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt) declined to give the jury 
instruction, prepared by Ms. Holmstrom, dealing with proximate 
causation in the "sudden peril" context. Tr. Vol. V, 819-22. 
The jury determined that Mr. Hyatt was negligent but that 
his negligence was not a proximate cause of any of 
Ms. Holmstrom's damages. R. at 716-17. Having made that no-
proximate-cause determination, it answered no more questions on 
the Verdict. 
The District Court then entered Judgment, on the Verdict, 
in favor of C.R. England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt. R. at 895-97. 
Ms. Holmstrom then filed her Motion for Partial Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial on Remaining 
Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial on All Issues, 
contending that she was entitled either (1) to judgment, as a 
matter of law, on the proximate cause claim rejected by the 
jury, and a new trial on the remaining issues; or (2) a new 
trial on all issues. R. at 899-901. That Motion was based on 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50 (b), proposition that 
Ms. Holmstrom was entitled to a finding, as a matter of law, 
o 
that Mr. Hyatt's negligence was a proximate cause of her 
sustaining damages and, alternatively, on the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(6) proposition that there was 
insufficient evidence, given the law on which the jury was 
instructed, to sustain the no-proximate-cause verdict. 
The District Court by its Order denied that Motion (R. at 
983-85), and this Appeal ensued. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court committed error in refusing to 
include, in its charge to the jury, Ms. Holmstrom's proposed 
instruction dealing with the negligent selection of an unsafe 
route. That instruction was central to Ms. Holmstrom's theory 
of the case, and the District Court's erroneous refusal was 
prejudicial and constitutes reversible error. 
2. The District Court committed error in refusing to 
include, in its charge to the jury, the "sudden peril" 
proximate cause instruction proposed by Ms. Holmstrom. That 
proposed instruction was central to Ms. Holmstrom's theory of 
the case, and the District Court's refusal to include it was 
prejudicial and reversible error. 
3. The District Court committed reversible error in 
denying Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for a partial judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the proximate cause 
connection between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's 
1 0 
sustaining of damages, inasmuch as no reasonable jury could 
have found that no proximate causation had been established. 
4. The District Court committed reversible error in 
denying Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for New Trial on all issues, 
inasmuch as there was insufficient evidence to support that 
verdict. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO REFUSE TO GIVE 
MS. HOLMSTROM'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE 
SELECTION OF AN UNSAFE ROUTE. GIVEN MS. HOLMSTROM'S 
THEORY OF THE CASE AND THE "SUBSTANTIAL ROLE" ASPECT 
OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION LAW ON WHICH THE JURY WAS 
INSTRUCTED, THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE THAT 
INSTRUCTION LIKELY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL, 
AND THE ERROR WAS THUS PREJUDICIAL. 
Ms. Holmstrom proposed, consistent with her theory of the 
case, the following jury instruction: 
You may find, depending on the facts and circumstances of 
this case, either or both drivers negligent not only for 
their driving conduct itself but also, if he or she or 
both knew the route taken was hazardous, for taking that 
route. 
R. at 778. The District Court refused to give that 
instruction. See argument and ruling appearing at Tr. Vol. V, 
808-14. 
Throughout this litigation, in the pre-trial phase of this 
case, and at trial (e.g., Tr. Vol. II, 135-40; 175-79; 196-97), 
Ms. Holmstrom developed, as one of her primary theories of 
liability against the defendants, the proposition that the 
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route selected by Mr. Hyatt, the acknowledged agent of C.R. 
England, given his knowledge of the danger of trying to execute 
his right turn (as a function of the blind S-curve through 
which Ms. Holmstrom was moving when he began his turn, as a 
function of the foliage right near the corner, and as a 
function of the presence of old cars on the corner) (see, e.g., 
Tr. Vol. II, 122-35), was unsafe. Ms. Holmstrom brought to the 
District Court's attention, by citations (R. at 778) on the 
face of her proposed jury instruction, and during the jury 
instruction conference (Tr. Vol. V, 808-14), cases that support 
the giving of that instruction. Those cases are the following: 
Baker v. Decker, 212 P.2d 679 (Utah 1949); Wightman v. 
Bettilyon's, Inc., 390 P.2d 120 (Utah 1964); Wold v. Ogden 
City, 258 P.2d 453 (Utah 1953); Blacconeri v. Aguayo, 478 
N.E.2d 546, 550 (111. App. 1985). 
There is nothing, in law or logic, and contrary to the 
District Court's determination, that suggests that the 
principle recognized in those cases (which are pedestrian cases 
in the contributory negligence realm) should not apply to the 
negligence of an operator of a motor vehicle. The District 
Court, in contravention of its duty, as a matter of settled 
Utah law (e.g., State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 
1998); Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d 835 (Utah 1951)), to 
instruct the jury fairly on Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case, 
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erred by refusing to include the proposed instruction in its 
charge to the jury. 
The significance of the District Court's error in refusing 
to include the proposed instruction cannot, in the context of 
this Appeal, be overstated. As explained hereinabove, the jury 
found, by its Special Verdict (R. at 716-18), that Mr. Hyatt 
was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause 
of any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. The proximate cause 
instruction, to the giving of which the parties stipulated, 
provided as follows: 
If you determine that either Mr. Hyatt or Ms. Holmstrom 
was negligent, then you must also decide whether that 
negligence was a "proximate cause" of any of 
Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. 
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a cause and 
effect relationship between any such negligence and any of 
Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. But cause and effect alone is 
not enough. For an injury to be proximately caused by 
negligence, two other factors must be present: 
1. The negligence must have played a substantial role in 
causing the injury; and 
2. A reasonable person could foresee that some injury 
could result from the negligence. 
R. at 756 (emphasis added). The defendants never contested the 
proposition that Ms. Holmstrom had sustained serious orthopedic 
injuries in the subject collision. The parties stipulated, and 
the jury was so instructed (R. at 761), that Ms. Holmstrom had 
incurred at least $44,257.28 in medical expenses as results of 
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the collision. Nor have the defendants contested the 
proposition that a reasonable person could foresee that some 
injury could result from the subject negligence of Mr. Hyatt. 
The only reasonable conclusion, given the uncontroverted facts 
of this case, is that the jury determined that Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence, found, as a fact, by the jury, did not play a 
"substantial role" in causing any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. 
A review of the defendants' Memorandum (R. at 923-931; see, 
especially, R. at 927) in opposition to Ms. Holmstrom's post-
trial Motion verifies that defendants agree with that 
proposition. For C.R. England and Mr. Hyatt did not even argue 
that the jury could have reached its "no-proximate" 
determination on any basis other than the supposed lack of a 
"substantial role" connection between Mr. Hyatt's negligence 
and any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. 
In the absence of the District Court's instruction on this 
particular of the negligence of Mr. Hyatt, it is apparent, as a 
matter of reasonable inference, that the jury determined that 
all Mr. Hyatt did wrong was, being familiar with the "blind 
turn" he was attempting to execute, attempted to make the turn 
anyway {e.g., Tr. Vol. Ill, 124), and then moved across the 
center of the road and partially blocked Ms. Holmstrom's lane 
of travel (e.g., id., 147). The jury should have been 
instructed that his selection of an unsafe route (the one he 
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took — down Park Street to Division Lane — rather than, for 
example, his simply going down 27th South another one-half block 
to 5th East and turning right (if he had done so he wouldn't 
have had to deal with the S-turn) {e.g., id., 136-37)), could 
constitute an additional act of negligence. It is apparent 
that the jury, in the absence of this instruction, determined 
that Mr. Hyatt's negligence, when compared against the supposed 
negligence of Ms. Holmstrom, was not "substantial." 
Ms. Holmstrom recognizes that error is "harmless" (Rule 61 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; e.g., State v. Perez, 924 
P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1996)) when it does not negatively impact 
the substantial rights of a party. Ms. Holmstrom also 
understands that Rule 61 and settled Utah case law place upon 
an appellant not only the burden of showing that an error 
occurred but that that error was substantial and prejudicial. 
E.g., Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). 
Ms. Holmstrom also understands that she must show a reasonable 
likelihood that, without the error, the outcome would have been 
different. E.g., Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 
12 (Utah 1999). Ms. Holmstrom also brings to the Court's 
attention the following rule of law stated in Watters v. 
Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981): 
The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to have 
[her] theory of the case submitted to the jury. Where 
there is evidence advanced to support a party's theory of 
1 R 
the case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to 
fail to instruct thereon. 
(Emphasis added.) See, also, Biswell v. Duncan, 724 P.2d 80, 
88 (Utah App. 1987) : "Failure to give requested jury 
instruction constitutes reversible error ... if the omission ... 
insufficiently ... advises the jury on the law." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Ms. Holmstrom contends that the most peculiar result at 
trial was rooted, in substantial part, in the District Court's 
refusal to instruct on an important part of Ms. Holmstrom's 
theory of the case and that the rules of law set forth in 
Watters and Biswell, as applied to the facts of this case, 
mandate the conclusion that the District Court's error in 
refusing sufficiently to instruct the jury on Ms. Holmstrom's 
theory of the case amounted to reversible error and that, 
accordingly, Ms. Holmstrom is entitled to a reversal and either 
a partial or plenary new trial. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE "SUDDEN 
PERIL" PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTION PROPOSED BY 
MS. HOLMSTROM WAS ERROR. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE, THAT ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS, BUT 
PREJUDICIAL, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
THE INSTRUCTION ENTITLES MS. HOLMSTROM TO A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The District Court refused to give, as worded, another 
instruction proposed by Ms. Holmstrom. That was her proposed 
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"sudden peril" proximate cause instruction. That proposed 
instruction was worded as follows: 
You may appropriately determine that Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Holmstrom's 
injuries if, but not only if, you find: (1) that Mr. Hyatt 
negligently caused a situation of sudden peril; and (2) 
that Ms. Holmstrom, acting under the impulse of fear, made 
an instinctive effort to escape; and (3) in so doing, 
Ms. Holmstrom sustained injuries, even though it might now 
appear that Ms. Holmstrom's attempt to escape was unwise 
or should have been made differently. 
R. at 779. This proposed instruction was a variation on "MUJI" 
stock instruction 4.3, which is worded as follows: 
If you find: (1) that the defendant negligently caused a 
situation of sudden peril; and (2) that the person in 
peril, acting under the impulse of fear, made an 
instinctive effort to escape; and (3) in so doing, that 
person sustained injuries or injured a third person, then 
you may find that defendant's negligence was the proximate 
cause of the injury, even though it might now appear that 
the attempt to escape was unwise or should have been made 
differently. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It was uncontested, as explained hereinabove, that 
Mr. Hyatt started making his sweeping right-hand turn, which 
would cause him at least partially to block Ms. Holmstrom's 
lane of travel, when he could not see her, or anyone else who 
might be coming along, traveling westbound on Division.4 It is 
also uncontested that the C.R. England truck being driven by 
Mr. Hyatt was moving to Ms. Holmstrom's right when she first 
See, e.g., the factual recitation, including record citations, set forth at 
34-36, infra. 
recognized the emergency; that this was a "dynamic" situation; 
and that it took Mr. Hyatt time and distance to bring his truck 
to a stop (e.g., testimony of Ronald Woolley, defendant's 
liability expert, Tr. Vol. IV, 686; 713-18). It is also 
uncontested that it took Ms. Holmstrom time to perceive and 
react to the fact that the truck was moving into her lane 
(e.g., id., 673). It is also uncontested that both vehicles 
were across the center of the road when the collision occurred. 
See, e.g., Trial Exhibits P-10 and D-19. There was also 
unrebutted testimony that Ms. Holmstrom tried to go left, 
thinking the truck would continue to move in front of her and 
further block her path of travel (e.g., testimony of 
Ms. Holmstrom, Tr. Vol. Ill, 510-11), but that, because her 
tires locked up in response to the braking attempt, she 
continued going straight (e.g., testimony of Ronald Probert, 
Ms. Holmstrom's accident reconstructionist, Tr. Vol. II, 225-
26). It is also uncontested that there was room for 
Ms. Holmstrom to get around the truck, where it ultimately came 
to rest, if she had gone to the right (e.g., testimony of 
defendants' Dr. Woolley, Tr. Vol. IV, 660-61). 
It thus appears that Ms. Holmstrom was entitled to a 
sudden peril proximate cause instruction. The reason that she 
did not submit the MUJI instruction verbatim, as she explained, 
through her counsel, in the conference on jury instructions 
18 
(Tr. Vol. V, 819-20) is that the stock MUJI instruction, given 
its ambiguous wording (set forth, supra, at 17), may fairly be 
read to mean, as applied to this case, that the only way the 
jury could find a proximate cause connection between 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence and any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries was 
if the jury should find that this was, indeed, a "sudden peril" 
situation. Accordingly, and out of recognition that 
Ms. Holmstrom should not, as a matter of law or logic, be that 
limited with respect to her chances of prevailing on the 
proximate cause issue, Ms. Holmstrom submitted the modified 
instruction that included the "if, but not only if" language. 
Ms. Holmstrom submits that this modified "sudden peril" 
instruction made perfect sense; fit the facts of this case; 
was, unlike the MUJI form instruction, not ambiguous; and 
should have been given by the District Court, consistent with 
its duty fairly to instruct the jury on Ms. Holmstrom's theory 
of the case. As a review of the colloquy regarding this 
proposed instruction (Tr. Vol. V, 820) will make clear, the 
District Court expressed the view that the proposed instruction 
was not clear and needed to be reworded, and counsel for 
Mr. Hyatt and C.R. England expressed the view, with which the 
District Court agreed (id., 821) that the instruction, if 
given, needed to include some counterpart language that the 
jury should disregard the instruction if the jury should find 
1 Q 
that Ms. Holmstrom herself caused the "sudden peril." 
Ms. Holmstrom and the defendants were unable to agree to 
satisfactory alternative language and, accordingly, the 
District Court did not give the proposed instruction. 
Ms. Holmstrom submits that the instruction she proposed, unlike 
the MUJI instruction, was clear and in accordance with the law, 
that the proposed instruction did not need to be reworded, that 
the District Court was in error in its determination that the 
defendants were entitled to the language they requested, and 
that it was prejudicial error, in the circumstances of this 
case, for the District Court to refuse to give the instruction 
as proposed. 
Again, as with the negligent route selection instruction 
discussed hereinabove, Ms. Holmstrom was entitled, pursuant to 
settled Utah law (see, e.g., discussion of Watters and Biswell 
cases appearing at 15-16, supra), to have the jury fairly 
instructed on her theory of the case.5 As explained 
hereinabove, the proposed sudden peril instruction completely 
fit the facts of this case. It was all over the trial of this 
case that Ms. Holmstrom was faced with an emergency not of her 
doing when Mr. Hyatt turned in front of her. It was also 
5
 The Court may deem it appropriate, as it weighs the question of whether the 
District Court's refusal to give two instructions central to Ms. Holmstrom's 
theory of the case constituted prejudicial error, to consider the cumulative 
effect of the District Court's refusals. 
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uncontested that, as things turned out (with the truck stopping 
rather than continuing its wide, sweeping turn), there was room 
for Ms. Holmstrom to go to the right. And it certainly thus 
eventuated that Ms. Holmstrom's attempted escape route turned 
out to be ill-advised. The District Court's failure to give 
the instruction submitted by Ms. Holmstrom was erroneous. 
Because of the jury's "No" answer to the proximate cause 
question, was not harmless but prejudicial error; and 
Ms. Holmstrom is, accordingly, entitled to a new trial. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
DENYING MS. HOLMSTROM'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE ISSUE. 
At the conclusion of the defendants' case, Ms. Holmstrom 
moved (pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) for a partial directed verdict, contending that, as 
matters of law, the District Court should determine that 
defendant Hyatt was negligent and that that negligence was a 
proximate cause of at least some of Ms. Holmstrom's damages. 
Tr. Vol. V, 831-32. The District Court denied that motion. As 
stated hereinabove, the jury determined that Mr. Hyatt was 
negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of 
any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. 
Ms. Holmstrom urges this Court to rule that she was 
entitled to a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
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based on the evidence presented at trial. If the Court grants 
this requested relief, the appropriate remand order would be 
for a new trial on questions of Ms. Holmstrom's negligence; the 
proximate cause connection between her negligence, if any, and 
her injuries; respective percentages of causal fault, if she 
had any, between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and her negligence, if 
any; and, if her causal fault, if any, should be determined to 
be less than 50% of the total, the amounts of damages sustained 
by her as results of the subject collision. 
A directed verdict is appropriate only when the trial 
court is able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable 
jurors would not differ, based on the law and on the evidence 
presented, on the proposition to be determined. E.g., 
Management Comm. of Graystone Pine Homeowners' Ass'n v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). In 
ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
the trial court is governed by the same rules as when it is 
ruling on a motion for directed verdict. E.g., Koer v. Mayfair 
Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1967). The purpose of Rule 
50(b) (the rule dealing with motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict) is to allow a trial judge to 
permit a question to go to the jury and then, if the jury's 
verdict on that question is contrary to the moving party's 
position, to re-examine the issue when there is more time for 
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del ibera t ion , and then to determine whether the question should 
have gone to the jury in the f i r s t place. Roche v. Zee, 264 
P.2d 855, 855-56 (Utah 1953). The question here i s whether 
reasonable jurors could determine tha t Mr. Hyat t ' s negligence 
was not a proximate cause of at l eas t some of Ms. Holmstrom's 
damages. This Court ' s examination of the issues should focus 
primari ly on two th ings : (1) the uncontested nature of the 
co l l i s i on , as described hereinabove; and (2) the law of 
proximate causation, as embodied in jury ins t ruc t ion No. 34 (R. 
at 767, agreed to by the pa r t i e s pr ior to t r i a l , a copy of 
which i s attached hereto in the Addendum, at 003, and which i s 
a lso set forth, verbatim, supra, at 13).6 There was simply, on 
the facts of t h i s case, no question on which reasonable minds 
could differ (1) tha t there was a cause-and-effeet r e l a t ionsh ip 
between Mr. Hyat t ' s negligence and, at l e a s t , Ms. Holmstrom's 
orthopedic i n j u r i e s ; (2) that defendant Hyat t ' s negligence 
played a subs tan t ia l role in causing those i n j u r i e s ; and (3) 
tha t a reasonable person could foresee that some injury could 
r e s u l t from that negligence. 
6
 See, a l s o , i n s t r u c t i o n s nos. 33 (R. a t 755) and 35 (R. a t 757) reproduced 
in the Addendum a t , r e s p e c t i v e l y , 004 and 005, s e t t i n g fo r th , r e s p e c t i v e l y , 
the p ropos i t i on t h a t t h e r e can be more than one proximate cause of given 
i n j u r i e s , and t h a t , in order to e s t a b l i s h proximate causa t ion , i t i s not 
necessary t ha t a l l of Ms. Holmstrom's claimed damages be determined t o be 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to the negl igence in ques t ion . 
On the facts of this case it was, and is, clear that, but 
for Mr. Hyatt's negligence — determined by the jury to be a 
fact — the collision would not have occurred, Ms. Holmstrom 
would not have been injured, and Ms. Holmstrom would not have 
sustained her orthopedic injuries and incurred in excess of 
$44,000 in medical expenses. On the facts of this case — 
unlike others where, for example, numerous actors are involved 
so that a given defendant can fairly argue that his conduct was 
of de minimis significance — it was, and is, clear that 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence played a substantial role in causing 
Ms. Holmstrom's orthopedic injuries. 
Another category of cases in which proximate cause is a 
real factual issue involves the passage of time between a 
defendant's negligent act and the sustaining of injuries. This 
is not one of those cases. It is indisputable that, in this 
case, at least some of Mr. Hyatt's negligence and the collision 
occurred virtually simultaneously. Also, on the facts of this 
case, it was, and is, clear that any reasonable person could 
foresee that some injury could result from negligent conduct 
such as that engaged in by Mr. Hyatt, who turned, without being 
able to see whether anyone was coming, who made a wide turn, 
who drove across the center of the road, and who, consistent 
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with an instruction that was given,7 failed to yield the right-
of-way to Ms. Holmstrom. No-proximate-cause determinations 
typically come in situations where all damages are in dispute 
(as in situations involving low-speed rear-end collisions 
and/or situations involving pre-existing medical conditions 
where the medical evidence is mixed), and in multi-actor and 
substantial passage-of-time situations. Ms. Holmstrom's 
counsel's research has unearthed no Utah or other case 
involving factual situations and issues like this one, and in 
which a jury found a defendant to be negligent, in which a 
jury's no-proximate-cause determination-has been upheld.8 This 
Court should, as a matter of law, determine that Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence was a proximate cause of at least some of 
Ms. Holmstrom's damages and order (such a result seems 
logically to follow) that a new trial be conducted on all 
issues other than Mr. Hyatt's negligence and the proximate 
7
 Jury Instruction number 25.5 (R. at 747) provided: 
Utah law provides that an operator of a vehicle approaching an 
intersection not regulated by an official traffic-control 
device, from a street that does not continue beyond the 
intersection, shall yield the right-of-way to the operator of 
any vehicle on the intersecting street. 
8
 For a remarkably similar case, in which an appellate court reversed a trial 
court's denial of a motion for j.n.o.v., on the proximate cause question, 
see Hardison v. Bushnell, 22 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. App. 1993), discussed, at 
greater length, at 46-47, infra. For a discussion of cases that support the 
proposition that Ms. Holmstrom is, at a minimum, entitled to a new trial on 
all issues, please see pages 47-48, infra. 
causation connection between his negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's 
damages. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
DENYING MS. HOLMSTROM' S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ALL 
ISSUES. 
If this Court rejects Ms. Holmstrom's argument, set forth 
in the immediately preceding part C. of this Argument section 
of this Brief, that the District Court committed reversible 
error in denying her Motion for Partial Directed Verdict on the 
proximate cause question, and if this Court determines that the 
District Court did not prejudicially err with respect to its 
refusal to give either of Ms. Holmstrom's proposed jury 
instructions discussed hereinabove, this Court should consider 
the proposition that there was, nonetheless, insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's no-proximate-cause determination 
and should remand for a new trial on all issues. 
Utah trial courts are appropriately vested with great 
discretion to fix, in the interest of justice, the mistakes of 
juries. The Court is respectfully urged to consider the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 
P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991) ("The trial judge is free to grant ... 
a motion for a new trial if it is reasonable to conclude that 
the jury erred." "... a trial judge may properly grant a new 
trial under Rule 59(a) (6) when he ... can reasonably conclude 
that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence 
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or that there is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict ... 
Id. at 799, n. 9); as well as the older case of Efco 
Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966): 
Notwithstanding the admitted virtues of the jury system, it 
must be recognized that as in all human institutions, 
juries are subject to error. For a jury verdict to be 
regarded as completely beyond control or correction would 
permit the jury itself in some instances to be an 
instrument of despotic action rather than of the law and 
order it is purposed to preserve. For this reason it is 
essential that there exist in the court supervisory 
authority to rectify mistakes. 
If it clearly appears that there has been a miscarriage of 
justice because the jury has refused to accept credible, 
uncontradicted evidence where there is no rational basis 
for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that the jury 
has acted under a misconception of proven facts, or has 
misapplied or disregarded the law, or where it appears that 
the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, it is 
both the prerogative and the duty of the court to set aside 
the verdict and grant a new trial. This does not have the 
effect of depriving a party of a fair trial by jury, but in 
reality is a safeguard to assure it. 
Id. at 617 (emphasis added). 
It is not important to the present discussion that in both 
Crookston and Efco, the Supreme Court found that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding and, thus, 
upheld the trial court's denial of the losing party's motion 
for new trial. The Court should focus on the law, as laid down 
by the Supreme Court, setting forth Utah trial courts' power 
and duty regarding trials in cases (such as this, regarding the 
jury's "no proximate cause" finding) where there is not suffi-
cient evidence to support a jury's factual finding. The Court 
may and must, in such cases, fix things so that a party may 
have a second trial before a jury that cannot be expected to 
err as did the first. 
As stated above, Ms. Holmstrom!s undersigned counsel's 
research has unearthed no case, similar on its facts to the 
instant case, in which a jury's no-proximate-cause 
determination has stood up through the post-trial motion and 
appellate review process. 
As stated above, the jury instruction setting forth the 
legal definition of proximate cause given by the Court was 
agreed to by the parties. A careful reading of that instruc-
tion, in light of the dynamics of the subject collision and the 
evidence presented at trial, makes it very clear that there was 
"insufficient evidence" (the Rule 59(a)(6) standard) to support 
the jury's "no proximate cause" determination. 
Ms. Holmstrom through her counsel understands that she is 
required, in pursuit of her contention that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's no-proximate-cause verdict, 
to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict. E.g., State 
v. Benvenuto, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999); Child v. 
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998); Von Hake v. Thomas, 
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). As suggested hereinabove, there 
is, to her undersigned counsel's knowledge, literally no 
evidence which would support a reasonable jury's determination 
that there was not a proximate cause connection between 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence and the sustaining of injuries and 
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damages by Ms. Holmstrom, but Ms. Holmstrom's counsel wi l l 
nonetheless do t h e i r best to bring any such possible evidence 
to the Court 's a t t en t ion , p r ior to se t t ing forth the contrary 
evidence.9 
1. EVIDENCE CONCEIVABLY IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT 
L a r r y J o n e s , t h e A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r of S a f e t y f o r C.R. 
England , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i n t e r s e c t i o n i s "no l e s s 
d a n g e r o u s t h a n any o t h e r s , " and t h a t " [ t ] h e r e i s some t h i n g s t o 
c o n s i d e r h e r e b u t a l l i n t e r s e c t i o n s a r e i n h e r e n t l y d a n g e r o u s i n 
one way o r a n o t h e r " (Tr . Vo l . I I , a t 184) . 
Ronald L. P r o b e r t , Ms. H o l m s t r o m ' s a c c i d e n t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
e x p e r t , acknowledged t h a t t h e r e i s a v e r y good l i k e l i h o o d 
[based s o l e l y on what became t h e p o i n t of i m p a c t ] t h a t t h e 
c o l l i s i o n would have happened even i f Mr. H y a t t had s t a y e d 
c o m p l e t e l y i n h i s own l a n e of t r a v e l (Tr. Vo l . I I , 2 5 0 ) ; t h a t 
i f Ms. Holmstrom had s t a r t e d h e r emergency r e a c t i o n t o t h e 
t r u c k coming i n t o h e r l a n e a h a l f second e a r l i e r t h e r e would 
have been no c o l l i s i o n [id., 2 5 5 ) ; t h a t i t i s " p l a u s i b l e " t h a t 
Mr. Hya t t was s t o p p e d f o r a c o u p l e of s econds b e f o r e impac t 
9
 The Court may deem i t app ropr i a t e to consider the e v i d e n t i a r y record 
referenced in t h i s p a r t (pages 29-42) of t h i s Brief in connect ion not only 
with t h i s s ec t i on D of t h i s Argument, but a l so in connection with the 
foregoing s ec t i on C (addressing the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court 
committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r in denying Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for Directed 
Verdict on the proximate cause i s s u e ) . Please note , a l s o , t h a t t h i s 
e v i d e n t i a r y marsha l l ing a t tempts to deal only with the " s u b s t a n t i a l r o l e " 
aspect of the no-proximate cause de te rmina t ion and not with every aspect of 
the negl igence of e i t h e r Mr. Hyatt or Ms. Holmstrom. 
{id., 259) ; t h a t Ms. Holmstrom had an opt ion t o go t o t he r i g h t 
[ r a t h e r than brake and t r y t o go l e f t ] (id., 261) ; t h a t 
Ms. Holmstrom could have s tayed in her own lane (id., 262) ; 
t h a t t he England t r u c k was "hard t o miss" (id., 268) and "easy 
t o s ee" (id., 269) . 
Dr. Mark Rindf lesh , a doc to r who did an " independent" 
medical examinat ion on Ms. Holmstrom, t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
Ms. Holmstrom t o l d him t h a t a t r u c k appeared in f ron t of her 
and i t happened so qu ick ly t h a t she wasn ' t sure what happened 
(Tr. Vol. I l l , 384) . 
Ray Gurule1 0 , a S a l t Lake Ci ty S a n i t a t i o n Department 
employee, whose job i t was, on t he day of the c o l l i s i o n , t o 
empty garbage cans in the immediate v i c i n i t y of t he c o l l i s i o n , 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t a compact car might have been ab le t o go between 
the nor thernmost p a r t of the t r u c k , a t i t s s topped p o s i t i o n , 
and the curb t o the nor th of t h a t p o s i t i o n [ to Ms. Holmstrom's 
r i g h t ] (Tr. Vol. I l l , 421), and t h a t i t d o e s n ' t appear t h a t 
Ms. Holmstrom moved r i g h t or l e f t in Divis ion Lane a f t e r she 
l e f t t he S-curve (id., 426) . 
Mr. Guru le ' s l a s t name was mis taken ly l i s t e d by the cour t r e p o r t e r as 
"Argule"; Ms. Holmstrom's undersigned counsel apologizes for not asking 
Mr. Gurule t o s p e l l h i s name for the record ; i t should a l s o be noted t h a t 
t h e r e are many " i n a u d i b l e " r e f e r ences in the t r a n s c r i p t and many mis takes in 
t r a n s c r i p t i o n ; the t r a n s c r i p t was prepared from the v ideotape record ing of 
the D i s t r i c t Court p roceed ings ; and, i f t h e r e i s any doubt in the mind of 
the Court with r e spec t t o the a c t u a l tes t imony of any w i tnes s , i t might be 
adv i sab le for the Court t o review the a c t u a l v ideo tape . 
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Ms. Holmstrom herself testified that it is possible that, 
between the time she first saw the truck starting its turn and 
the time she realized it was coming into her lane of travel, 
she glanced at the clock or the speedometer of her car (Tr. 
Vol. Ill, 518); that she does not recall slowing down after 
seeing the truck starting its turn and before realizing it was 
coming into her lane {id., 541); that she does not believe she 
moved to her right after beginning to see the truck start its 
turn {id.); and that she probably told Dr. Rindflesh she was 
going 25-30 m.p.h. when the truck appeared and that it all 
happened so fast she wasn't quite sure what happened {id., 
564) . 
Jim Johnson, Ms. Holmstrom's boyfriend at that time and a 
person who came to the scene shortly after the collision 
occurred, testified that it was "goofy" that Ms. Holmstrom's 
car was left of center at the time of collision, that she 
"shouldn't be there" and that it "doesn't make sense" (Tr. Vol. 
IV, 595). 
Defendant Joseph Hyatt testified that when he first saw 
Cheryl Holmstrom's vehicle coming out of the S-curve it was 
slightly left of center (Tr. Vol. IV, 633); that he'd made the 
same turn several times in the past without any problem, that 
he believed that he was able to make the turn safely and that 
he did not want to make a "button-hook" turn from 5th East onto 
27 South, and that the subject intersection was "no dangerous" 
than any other [id., 609-10; 617). 
Ronald Woolley, defendants' accident reconstructionist 
liability expert, testified that Ms. Holmstrom had ample time 
and distance to react to and avoid the England truck, when, 
coming out of the S-curve, she first saw the truck (Tr. Vol. 
IV, 655); that there was [at that instant] time to steer to the 
right to get around the truck, time to slow down and give 
herself a better ability to steer, and time to come to a 
complete stop before arriving at what became the point of 
impact (id.); that there is no indication, from the physical 
evidence, that Ms. Holmstrom tried to swerve either left or 
right prior to impact (id., 655-56); that there is no 
indication that the truck was still moving on impact (id., 
659); that Ms. Holmstrom had ample distance to go to the right 
around what became the truck's resting place (id., 660-661); 
that if Ms. Holmstrom had hit her brakes .53 second sooner than 
she did there would not have been a collision (id., 663-64); 
that it was "an error in judgment" on Ms. Holmstrom's part not 
to track the truck from the time she first saw it until it 
actually stopped (id., 687); that Ms. Holmstrom made a 
"mistake" in not being a defensive driver after first noticing 
that the truck was turning [when it was not, at that instant, 
moving into her lane but in the appropriate lane and in the 
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direction opposite of the direction she was traveling] [id., 
688); that, if Ms. Holmstrom tried to go left when she saw the 
truck moving into her lane, that was an "error" "in judgment" 
[id., 726); that Ms. Holmstrom squandered "about a second" of 
the time she had available to her from the time she first saw 
the truck turning [when it was not, at that instant, moving 
into her lane but in the appropriate lane and in the direction 
opposite of the direction she was traveling] {id., 731); and 
that if Ms. Holmstrom never took her eyes off the truck from 
the time she saw it until the time of the collision, "that 
would fall into the category of just bad driver judgment" {id., 
735) . 
Reed Garff, the investigating officer, testified that 
Ms. Holmstrom's car was going straight west at impact (Tr. Vol. 
V, 773); that Ms. Holmstrom told him she looked at her clock 
and then looked up and "there the truck was" {id., 778); that 
Ms. Holmstrom was considerably left of center at the point of 
impact {id., 779); that his opinion regarding Ms. Holmstrom's 
driving conduct is that she was not paying attention to where 
she was going and "was watching her clock" {id., 779); that 
Mr. Hyatt was trying to prevent the accident {id., 779-80); 
that, at the time he did his investigation, the fact that the 
truck was over the center of the road and blocking part of the 
westbound lane "didn't seem like the cause and it wasn't 
considered a factor in it" [id., 1Q1)11 (emphasis added); and 
that, although he does not think it's unreasonable for people 
to glance down at a speedometer or to glance down at a clock, 
that "causes a lot of accidents" (id., 802). 
2. EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO THE VERDICT 
Defendant Joseph Hyatt testified that he was familiar with 
the subject intersection (Tr. Vol. II, 123); that he knew that 
this was a blind intersection for people, like himself, making 
a right turn from Park onto Division (id., 124); that a blind 
intersection constitutes a dangerous condition (id., 124); that 
the S-curve created a situation for the right-turning driver 
[himself in this case] turning right onto Division where the 
driver couldn't see traffic that was coming westbound on 
Division (id., 125); that the trees and the shrubs on the 
southeast corner of the intersection were another thing that 
made this a blind intersection and that he was aware, having 
lived in the neighborhood for four years, of the presence of 
those trees and shrubs (id., 124); that he knew that he should 
try to pick the safest route (id., 136); that another route he 
could have taken to do what he was doing (driving the truck 
around the block) was simply to take 27th South to 5th East (id., 
11
 It may be important to note that Officer Garff also there testified that 
"at that time [presumably, the time he did his investigation]" (emphasis 
added), the fact that Mr. Hyatt was over the center of the road did not 
enter into any of his decision. 
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136); that, if he'd taken that route he could have avoided all 
the problems with the blind intersection, with the S-curve and 
with cars parked near the southeast corner of Division and Park 
(id., 136-37); that a person in the S-curve would be unable to 
see Mr. Hyatt's truck creeping out onto Division Lane {id., 
146); that he knew that the size of his truck was an issue 
(id., 146); that he knew that he would have to pull partially 
into Ms. Holmstrom's lane of travel in order to complete his 
turn (id., 146); that he knew he had to yield the right of way 
to traffic that had the right of way (id., 147); that he 
acknowledged that it wouldn't be safe for him to occupy 
Ms. Holmstrom's lane of traffic with his truck unless he knew 
there was no traffic coming (id., 147-48); that he acknowledged 
that he started his turn and encroached into the westbound lane 
before he knew it was safe to do so (id., 149-50); that he does 
not believe that Ms. Holmstrom was acting unreasonably at the 
time of the accident (id. at 159); that he acknowledges having 
said "something like" "I didn't see you, I didn't see you," to 
Ms. Holmstrom immediately after the collision occurred (id., 
161); that he acknowledges that Ms. Holmstrom had the right of 
way (id., 162); that he didn't see Ms. Holmstrom's vehicle 
until it was coming out of the S-curve (id., 166); that he was 
stopped for only one or two seconds at the time of impact (id., 
172); that he agrees that he had to yield the right of way (Tr. 
Vol. IV, 626); that he agrees that he was not permitted to pull 
into the oncoming lane of traffic unless he knew it was safe to 
do so (id.); that a very short period of time went by between 
the time he first saw Ms. Holmstrom's vehicle and the time the 
collision occurred {id., 632); that it could have been as short 
as a second that he was stopped before impact (id., 633). 
Larry Jones, the Assistant Director of Safety for C.R. 
England, testified that, if the intersection at which the 
collision occurred was a dangerous intersection, Mr. Hyatt 
should not have taken the route he took (Tr. Vol. II, 179). 
Fred Henningson, a truck driver and driver evaluator for 
C.R. England, Inc., testified that it makes sense that a C.R. 
England driver who has a couple of different options to get to 
the same spot should always take the safer one (Tr. Vol. II, 
197), and that he agrees that a driver who has to make a wide 
turn needs to be careful, because he's going across the center 
of the road, so that he can see who is coming at all times 
(id., 202). 
Ronald Probert, Ms. Holmstrom's accident reconstruction 
liability expert witness, testified that the front of the 
England truck could have come to a rest as much as seven or 
eight feet left of center for the direction it was traveling 
(Tr. Vol. II, 219); that, in the aftermath of the subject 
collision and while doing his work on the case, he noticed that 
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cars traveling in the same direction Ms. Holmstrom was 
traveling tended to travel left of center and that he saw a 
police vehicle traveling in that fashion {id., 220-21); that 
[having to do with Ms. Holmstrom's account of her pre-impact 
evasive maneuver] once brakes are locked, a driver loses her 
steering capability [id., 225-26), that in such a situation the 
brake marks will show the vehicle still going straight [id., 
226); that if Ms. Holmstrom was trying to go left at the time 
the events were happening it suggests to him that she saw 
movement of the England truck going to her right when she made 
that maneuver {id., 226); that Ms. Holmstrom tried to avoid the 
accident, based on the physical evidence of the skid marks 
{id., 227); that there is nothing unreasonable about 
Ms. Holmstrom's looking down at her speedometer or clock {id., 
232); that Mr. Hyatt could have pulled out far enough into 
Division Lane and stopped without going into the westbound part 
of Division and be able to see clear through the S-curve and up 
to 6th East {id., 233-35); that Mr. Hyatt "had control of the 
situation" {id., 238); that Ms. Holmstrom was confronted with a 
hazard not of her own doing; that she chose to go left thinking 
that was her avenue of escape, and that if she had gone to the 
right that would assume that she believed the truck was going 
to stop {id., 238); and that Division Lane does not have a 
delineator center line {id., 241). 
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Edward Paul France, Ph.D., Ms. Holmstrom's accident 
reconstruction/human factors expert, testified that there is 
nothing unreasonable about glancing down at a speedometer or a 
clock as one is driving along (Tr. Vol. II, 297); that 
Ms. Holmstrom began to notice the truck just as it was pulling 
away from a stopped position, that the truck was then just 
barely starting forward, that her expectation at that time 
would be that the truck was going to initiate a right-hand turn 
without intruding into her driving space and that she had to 
make a judgment at the time she realized that the truck was 
coming too far out and coming into what was for her the right-
hand lane of travel {id., 298-99); that she perceived that 
there was a clearing space opening up behind the truck for her 
to go to the left and at the same time perceived that the truck 
was going to continue to sweep north in its position, and that, 
as she was processing all that information, the truck stopped 
{id., 299-300); that the truck was either stopped or almost 
stopped at the time the collision occurred {id., 300); that her 
perception was, seeing the truck moving to her right, that the 
area to her right was going to be closed and not open to her to 
travel through {id., 302); that, by the time the truck came far 
enough into the road, there was not enough time for 
Ms. Holmstrom to react and bring her car to a stop {id., 313); 
that Ms. Holmstrom had a very short time to make the judgment 
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she had to make and that it was reasonable for her to assume 
that the driver of the truck was going to do something to stay 
out of her way {id., 319); that it was reasonable for her to 
see the truck crawling out into the roadway and think it was 
not a threat to her; that the truck's conduct in coming across 
the center of the road was something she did not expect; and 
that her conduct was reasonable {id., 324). 
Dr. Rindflesh testified that he did not ask Ms. Holmstrom 
questions about when she perceived the truck or where the truck 
was when she perceived it (Tr. Vol. Ill, 391). 
Mr. Gurule, the Sanitation Department worker, testified 
that it seemed like a "split second" from the time that the 
truck started its turn until the time he saw it shaking, 
something he associated with the collision (Tr. Vol. Ill, 415), 
and that cars always travel in the middle of the road down the 
subject stretch of Division Lane {id., 417-18). 
Ms. Holmstrom testified that she hadn't seen the truck 
before she got out of the S-turn (Tr. Vol. Ill, 508); that when 
she first saw the truck it was slowly moving out into the 
eastbound lane of Division {id., 508-09); that, when she first 
saw the truck, she assumed that the truck would either stay on 
its side of the road or stop and that she believed she had the 
right of way {id., 509-10); that she then realized that the 
truck was proceeding farther northeasterly than she was 
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comfortable with and that that surprised her {id., 510); that 
she decided, based on the fact that the truck was at that point 
still proceeding forward, apparently into her lane of traffic, 
she should go to the left (id., 510-11); that she slammed on 
the brakes and tried to go left, simultaneously, in an attempt 
to get through where she figured there would be daylight (id., 
511); that, although she could not recall whether the truck was 
still moving when the impact occurred, it was moving when she 
tried to go left (id., 511-12); that at the point when she 
realized she should try to go left, she was approximately 
halfway between where she first saw the truck and where the 
collision occurred (id., 512); that, right after the collision 
occurred, Mr. Hyatt came over and said "in almost a panic 
manner/' "I didn't see you, I didn't see you" (emphasis added; 
id., 513-14); that, when she first saw the truck, she assumed 
that its driver would "do what was right," and that he would 
"either stay on his side of the road or stop" (id., 539); that, 
when she drives through residential areas, she tends to stay 
kind of toward the middle because of things and people, 
including children, that might be shooting out from her side 
(id., 559); that, when she knew that she had to take evasive 
action, the truck looked like it was going to keep coming in 
front of her even further (id., 560); that if the truck had 
stopped even close to being on its own side of the road she 
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would have made a slight adjustment to the right and driven 
right on past the truck (id., 560-61). 
Ronald Woolley, defendants' accident reconstruction 
expert, testified that, having been to the scene and worked on 
the case, he's observed that it's common for cars to 
"straighten out" the S-curve as they drive through, and that 
what Ms. Holmstrom did in so negotiating the curve and the 
street at that point appears to be a "natural tendency" (Tr. 
Vol. IV, 660); that Ms. Holmstrom was not driving at an 
unreasonable speed [id., 671-672); that the time it would take 
Ms. Holmstrom to perceive and react to an emergency was 
approximately one and one-half seconds (id.r 673); that 
Ms. Holmstrom traveled, in that one and one-half seconds, 
approximately 60 feet (id.); that there was only 120 feet 
between the time she first saw the truck and the point of 
collision (id., 674-75); that he does not fault someone for 
simply checking a clock or a speedometer (id. , 679); that this 
was a dynamic situation unfolding (id., 686); that the reason 
that Mr. Hyatt brought the truck to a halt was that he saw 
Ms. Holmstrom's vehicle (id., 691); that, given the dynamics of 
the accident, "it's way too long" for Mr. Hyatt to have been 
stopped for three or four seconds at the point of impact (id., 
708); that it would take approximately a second and a half for 
Mr. Hyatt, like Ms. Holmstrom, to perceive and react (id., 
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714); that, after the perception and reaction time, it would 
take Mr. Hyatt some additional time to bring his truck to a 
stop (id., 714); that it would take Mr. Hyatt, from the time he 
began to perceive and react until the time he stopped his 
truck, three to four seconds, "probably under five" (id., 717-
18); that "the clock's the same for both [Ms. Holmstrom and 
Mr. Hyatt]" (id., 725); that "you crowd the center on this 
road; I think the traffic does that" (emphasis added; id., 
729); that it's "kind of natural when one is coming out of the 
S-curve to "slice the corner, kind of straighten out the curve" 
(id., 731); that, as Ms. Holmstrom was driving along, she 
didn't know of the wide turn Mr. Hyatt was going to make and 
she didn't know he wasn't going to stop and be safe (id. at 
733); and that, if Ms. Holmstrom had reacted one-half second 
sooner, she would have stopped without colliding with the truck 
(id. at 742). 
3. THE EVIDENCE, IF ANY, IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT, WAS 
SO SLIGHT AND UNCONVINCING AS TO MAKE THE VERDICT 
PLAINLY UNREASONABLE AND UNJUST. 
In their Memorandum in Opposition to Ms. Holmstrom's post-
trial Motion, defendants brought to the District Court's 
attention cases, including Braithwaite v. West Valley City 
Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1996) (R. at 925), supportive 
of the proposition that the only time that a jury verdict 
should be overturned, on Rule 59(a) (6) grounds is when that 
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verdict is ''manifestly against the weight of the evidence." 
This, Ms. Holmstrom respectfully submits, as is clear from the 
foregoing recitation of the evidence, just such a case. The 
only conceivable basis, given the record of this case, for the 
jury's "No" answer to the proximate cause question, and (as 
explained hereinabove) the only basis on which defendants even 
argued that the no-proximate-cause verdict could stand, was on 
the supposed lack of a "substantial role" played by Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence. Again, there was no question that there was a 
cause-and-effeet connection between Mr. Hyatt's making his 
unsafe turn when he could not see whether anyone was coming; it 
was a stipulated fact that Ms. Holmstrom sustained serious 
injuries and damages as a result of the collision; and there 
was no question that a reasonable person could foresee that 
some injury could result from Mr. Hyatt's negligence. 
The question then becomes whether the jury's finding that 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence did not play a "substantial role" in 
causing Ms. Holmstrom's damages was "manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence," or, in the alternatively cast test of 
Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996), whether the 
evidence in favor of the verdict was "so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust." Stated somewhat more specifically, the question is 
whether the jury could fairly conclude that either Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence was so slight as to render it a non-substantial role 
or that Ms. Holmstrom's negligence was so great as to fairly 
render the role played by Mr. Hyatt's negligence non-
substantial. As has been demonstrated in the foregoing 
marshalling of the evidence, it cannot fairly be stated that 
Mr. Hyatt's negligence was inconsequential. He selected a 
route that was unsafe; he made too wide a turn; he ended up 
well across the center of the road; he started his turn when he 
knew he could not see who was coming along the street on which 
drivers, including Ms. Holmstrom, had the right of away; and he 
testified that he did not think Ms. Holmstrom's conduct was 
unreasonable. Nor can it be fairly concluded that 
Ms. Holmstrom's negligence was comparatively so great as to 
render Mr. Hyatt's negligence inconsequential. As has been 
demonstrated, her speed was reasonable, and her driving down 
the middle of the road was something not at all out of the 
ordinary. All the defendants had to work with was the 
proposition that Ms. Holmstrom should have anticipated, as a 
defensive driver, that the England truck might come across the 
road in front of her, and that all she did wrong was to 
squander a half a second to a second. 
In these circumstances, it cannot be fairly concluded that 
Ms. Holmstrom's conduct, especially when compared against that 
of Mr. Hyatt, was so great as to render not substantial the 
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role his negligence caused in causing her injuries. Careful 
and thoughtful analysis thus leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that the jury's no-proximate-cause conclusion was erroneous and 
that Ms. Holmstrom is entitled to a new trial. 
Ms. Holmstrom is confident that, once the Court considers 
the evidence discussed in the foregoing recitation, and 
whatever additional evidence Mr. Hyatt and C.R. England bring 
to the Court's attention, the Court will be satisfied that, for 
whatever reason, the jury rejected the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence presented at trial and that application of settled 
Utah standards of appellate review should cause the Court to 
order a new trial. For the evidence here was "so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust." Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996); 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982); Roylance v. 
Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah App. 1987). Ms. Holmstrom 
recognizes, and asks the Court to keep in mind that, if the 
Court is not persuaded that the District Court should have 
granted the j.n.o.v., 
[t]he standard to be applied by the trial court in 
determining whether to grant a motion for a jnov is 
stricter than the standard for deciding to grant a new 
trial. A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). Unlike a party 
appealing from the denial of a motion for a j.n.o.v., a party 
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urging the court to recognize that there was insufficiency in 
the evidence to warrant a particular factual finding must meet 
the considerably less rigorous "so slight and unconvincing as 
to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust" standard 
recognized in Sharp, Nelson, Roylance cases cited above, and by 
this Court in Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P. 2d 
1213, 1216 (Utah App. 1997). 
4. CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORT 
MS. HOLMSTROM'S POSITION. NO APPLICABLE UTAH CASE 
HOLDS TO THE CONTRARY. 
Courts from other jurisdictions have recognized, in 
factual circumstances similar to those involved in this case, 
that juries1 finding of "no proximate cause" have been 
unsupported by the evidence and have acted to correct juries1 
errors. 
In Hardison v. Bushnell, 22 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. App. 
1993), for example, a California appellate court reversed the 
trial courtfs denial of a plaintiff's motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial in a case in 
which a jury had found negligence but no proximate cause in a 
situation in which the defendant, a truck driver, had turned 
into plaintiff's lane of travel. In the course of its cogent 
analysis (the facts and the law are discussed in only three 
pages), which Ms. Holmstrom commends to the Court's attention, 
the Court observed: 
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Clearly, respondent's turning his truck into the path 
of [the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a 
• passenger] was a substantial factor in causing the 
injuries suffered by [the plaintiff]. 
Id. at 107. 
Also, in Rogers v. Pi Christina, 600 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y. 
App. 1993): 
The jury found that defendants were negligent but that 
their negligence did not proximately cause plaintiff!s 
injuries. 
Thereafter, the trial court granted plaintiffs1 motion to 
set aside that portion of the jury verdict that found an 
absence of causation because the jury!s finding was 
against the weight of the evidence ... . 
We conclude that [the trial court] properly set aside that 
portion of the jury verdict that found that defendants' 
negligence did not cause plaintiff's injuries. That find-
ing could not have been reached upon any fair 
interpretation of the evidence. [citations to New York 
cases omitted]. 
Id. at 403 (emphasis added). Also instructive is Murteza v. 
State of Connecticut, 508 A.2d 449 (Conn. App. 1986), a case 
involving an intersection collision in which the jury found 
negligence but no proximate cause and in which the appellate 
court ultimately upheld the judgment on that verdict by reason 
of the fact that, unlike in this case, the question of whether 
the plaintiff had sustained any substantial injury was 
vigorously contested in the evidence. The Murteza court 
observed, for purposes pertinent to the instant discussion: 
... An examination of the photographs in evidence shows 
substantial damage to the truck and the automobile ... . 
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There is no doubt that under the ... conditions shown by the 
evidence, [defendant's agent's] negligence ... must reason-
ably be found to have been a proximate cause of the 
accident. 
Id. at 453. 
In the circumstances of this case, there is no evidence, 
let alone "sufficient evidence," to support the jury's finding 
of no proximate cause. As stated hereinabove, at 25, 
Ms. Holmstrom's counsel has found no case from Utah or 
elsewhere with facts and issues similar to those involved in 
this case, in which a no-proximate-cause verdict has been 
upheld on appeal. 
In reiteration of what has been stated hereinabove, there 
was "insufficient evidence to justify the verdict," and the no-
proximate-cause verdict was, in light of the evidence and the 
pertinent instructions given and the reasonable inferences to 
be drawn therefrom, clearly incorrect. In these circumstances, 
the District Court's denial of the Rule 59(a)(6) based aspect 
of Ms. Holmstrom's post-trial motion was erroneous and 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Ms. Holmstrom is, 
accordingly, entitled to a new trial, and this Court should so 
rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Utah Supreme Court cogently stated, nearly fifty years 
ago: 
As was observed by Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 1 
Burrows 390, the effect of a new trial is 'no more than 
having the cause more deliberately considered by another 
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jury, when there is reasonable doubt, or perhaps a 
certainty, that justice has not been done.' 
King v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 212 P.2d 692, 699 (Utah 1949). 
Based on the foregoing analysis and on the record of this 
case, Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court to reverse the District 
Court and remand for new trial, either on all issues except the 
question of the negligence of Mr. Hyatt and the proximate cause 
connection between that negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's damages, 
or for a new trial on all issues. 
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ADDENDUM 
SUBMITTED BY MS. HOLiMSTKOM 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. S-2 
You may find, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of this case, either or both drivers negligent 
not only for their driving conduct itself but also, if he or 
she or both knew the route taken was hazardous, for taking that 
route. 
Baker v. Decker, 212 P.2d 679 (Utah 1949) 
Wiqhtman v. Bettilvon's, Inc., 390 P.2d 120 (Utah 1964) 
Wald v. Qgden City, 258 P.2d 453 (Utah 1953) 
Blacconeri v. Aauayof 478 N.E.2d 546, 550 (111. App. 1985) 
SUBMITTED BY MS. HOLMSTROM 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. S-3 
You may appropriately determine that Mr. Hyatt's 
negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries, 
if, but not only if, you find: (1) that Mr. Hyatt negligently 
caused a situation of sudden peril; and (2) that Ms. Holmstrom, 
acting under the impulse of fear, made an instinctive effort to 
escape; and (3) in so doing, Ms. Holmstrom sustained injuries, 
even though it might now appear that Ms. Holmstrom's attempt to 
escape was unwise or should have been made differently. 
MUJI 4.3 (mod.) 
BAJI No. 4.41 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright @ 
1986 West Publishing Company 
nnl 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you determine that either Mr. Hyatt or 
Ms. Holmstrom was negligent, then you must also decide whether 
that negligence was a "proximate cause" of any of 
Ms. Holmstrom,s injuries. 
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a 
cause and effect relationship between any such negligence and 
any of Ms. Holmstrom7s injuries. But cause and effect alone is 
not enough. For an injury to be proximately caused by 
negligence, two other factors must be present: 
1. The negligence must have played a substantial 
role in causing the injury; and 
2. A reasonable person could foresee that some 
injury could result from the negligence. 
w 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
There may be more than one proximate cause of the 
same injury. If the negligence of two or more persons combines 
to produce an injury, and the negligence of each of them is a 
proximate cause of the injury, then the persons must share 
responsibility for the resulting injury, in proportion to their 
individual negligence. 
® 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the burden of proof to be satisfied on 
the proximate cause issue, it ds not necessary that you believe 
that all of Ms. Holmstrom's claimed injuries and damages have 
been caused by the negligence in question. It is only required 
that the proximate cause burden of proof be carried with 
respect to any part of her claimed injuries. 
% > 
